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Billowing White Goo
Jessica Litman*
The title of this symposium is the question: "Fair Use: "Incredibly Shrinking"
or ExtraordinarilyExpanding?" I'd argue that the answer to the question is "no."
Fair use isn't doing either.
The size of the fair use footprint has stayed remarkably constant over the past 30
or even 50 years. What has expanded, extraordinarily, is the size of rights granted
by the copyright law. It may seem as if fair use is either expanding or shrinking,
because the greater reach of copyright has made a bunch of uses potentially fair that
weren't even potentially infringing 50 years ago. In order to protect those uses
under the fair use umbrella we need to reach out, and grab it, and pull it over them.
But we aren't stretching fair use when we do that; we're just moving it. That
makes it look to some people as if fair use is expanding to cover new uses and to
others as if fair use is shrinking because it no longer covers uses that used to be
deemed fair. The culprit, then, is that we seem willing to tolerate a huge expansion
in the scope of copyright rights - most of that expansion, by the way, has been nonstatutory - but unwilling to countenance a similar expansion in the scope of fair
use.
I. MOVING THE FAIR USE UMBRELLA AROUND
When Congress codified fair use more than thirty years ago, it relied on a
Copyright Office study that canvassed more than a century of case law to try to
describe fair use.1 The Copyright Office concluded that courts deciding fair use
questions relied, more or less, on factors first articulated in the 1841 case, Folsom
v. Marsh. (Folsom v. Marsh was decided in an era in which copyright law
conferred only "the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
books, maps, charts, musical compositions and prints.) 3 The Copyright Office
recommended that the revision statute give explicit recognition to the fair use
doctrine, and the ultimate revision bill incorporated statutory language that reflected
* Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan. I'm grateful to Jon
Weinberg, whose perceptive comments improved this paper, as they have all of my earlier work. I'd
also like to thank Jane Ginsburg for asking for this paper, and Rob Kasunic for his helpful notes on an
earlier draft.
1. ALAN LATMAN, STUDY No. 14: FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in 2
COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (1963).
2. 9 F. Cas. 342 (1841). See generally R. Anthony Reese, The Story ofFolsom v. Marsh:
Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259
(Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds. 2006).
3. Act ofFebruary 3, 1831,4Stat. 436(1831).
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the Folsom v. Marsh factors. 4 Congress gave little attention to the overall reach of
the fair use provision at the time, notwithstanding the fact that the scope of fair use
was among the most contentious issues in the revision process. A controversy over
the fairness of educational uses erupted early and threatened to derail copyright
revision repeatedly until competing lobbyists reached a settlement in March of
1976. 5 While the dispute was still simmering, the Copyright Office advised
6
Congress to avoid further inflaming debate by taking sides on particular issues.
On the question whether fair use should be treated as an affirmative defense or
whether a copyright owner should be required to prove fair use as part of its prima
facie case, for example, the Register of Copyrights urged Congress to leave the
question unsettled:
We believe it would be undesirable to adopt a special rule placing the burden of proof
on one side or the other. When the facts as to what use was made of a work have been
presented, the issue as to whether it is a "fair use" is a question of law. Statutory
presumptions or burden-of-proof provisions could work a radical change in the
meaning and effect of the doctrine of fair use. The intent of section
107 is to give
7
statutory affirmation to the present judicial doctrine, not to change it.
In the years since the enactment of section 107, the Supreme Court has imposed
both statutory presumptions and burden of proof rules, 8 only to retract them later as
unwise. 9 In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Court adopted a presumption that
non-commercial use, including personal copying, was fair unless the copyright
owner could prove that it would harm the market for the copyrighted work. 10 In
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the Court applied the related presumption
that every commercial use was "presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.. ,.l While this
test for fair use ruled, personal copies and other "noncommercial uses" were
presumptively fair, 12 commercial parodies 13 and other commercial uses 14 were
4.
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 24-25 (1961), reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE USA, STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 1199, 1224-25 (1963); COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE US COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965
REVISION BILL 25-28 (1965) [hereinafter CLR PART 6].

5.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-74 (1976).
6. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 883-888 (1987).
7.
CLR PART 6, supra note 4, at 28.
8. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984).
9. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
10. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451; see also Jessica Litman, The Story of Sony: Mary Poppins Meets the
Boston Strangler,in GINSBURG & DREYFUSS, supra note 2, at 358, 379-82; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair
Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 981-85 (2002).
11. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
12. See, e.g., Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991).
13. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992);United Feature Syndicate v.
Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp.
826, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see generally William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued:
Profit, Presumptionsand Parody,11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993).
HeinOnline -- 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 588 2007-2008

20081

BILLOWING WHITE Goo

presumptively unfair. 15 The unavailability of fair use for all but the rare
commercial use proved intolerable, and in Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, the Court
insisted that it had never meant to adopt any sort of presumption either way.16
Then, it gave us what in practice has amounted to another one: to what extent is the
use "transformative?"
The first factor in a fair use enquiry is "the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes."... The central purpose of this investigation is to see.. .whether and to
what extent the new work is "transformative." Although such transformative use is
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use... the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright,.. .and the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance17 of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use.
In the wake of Campbell, all purported fair uses are evaluated on a scale of
18
transformativeness.
These tests differ from each other in meaningful ways, and don't yield the same
results on similar facts. For example, when appropriation artist Jeff Koons was
sued for copyright infringement in the period between Harper & Row and
Campbell for copying expression from copyrighted images, he raised a fair use

14. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (video newsclip
service unfair); Bridge Publn's, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 635 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (copying of
material L. Ron Hubbard lectures for commercial educational purpose unfair), vacated, 53 F.3d 344
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
15. See Litman, supra note 10, at 384-85. The situation for commercially published biographies
was complicated by a second presumption adopted by Harper & Row against fair use of unpublished
works. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 552-54. Biographies that made it past the problem posed by the
commercial use presumption tended to fail to surmount the presumption against quotation from
unpublished papers. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94-97 (2d Cir. 1987); New
Era Publn's Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583-85 (2d Cir. 1989). Congress
amended section 107 in 1992 to disapprove the presumption against pre-publication fair use. See Pub.
L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)). Campbell
came down not long afterwards.
16. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-85 (1994).
17. Id. at 578-79 (internal citations omitted).
18.
See, e.g., Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
karaoke recordings adding unlicensed lyrics to licensed music recordings not transformative); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding search engine copying and
aggregation of images into image search index to be transformative); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244,
251-56 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding painting appropriating images from copyrighted photograph to be
transformative); Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
"Seinfeld Aptitude Test" containing mock-SAT questions about the Seinfeld TV show not
transformative); Am. Geophysical v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding the photocopying
of scientific articles for at the request of researchers to be "archival" rather than "transformative"). See
generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
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defense and lost. 19 When Koons was sued for essentially the same sin after
Campbell, he raised a fair use defense and prevailed.20
While the Sony
presumptions were ascendant, Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording Act
exempting consumers from copyright liability for noncommercial copying of
recorded music. 21 At the time, members of Congress believed they were giving
consumers a complete free pass to make any copies of recorded music that
technology would allow; they thought, moreover, that they were merely confirming
what the courts had already held.22 Eight years later, Napster sought to make
precisely those arguments: that consumer copying of recorded music was either fair
use under Sony, permissible under the Audio Home Recording Act, or both.23 The
court didn't think the arguments
merited serious consideration, and resolved them
24
against Napster summarily.
In the question-and-answer session following Paul Goldstein's keynote speech
at this symposium, an audience member asked whether Sony would be decided the
that it would not, and nobody
same way today. Professor Goldstein was confident
25
in the audience took issue with his conclusion.
It seems clear that today's fair use test privileges uses that yesterday's test
would not, and vice versa. It seems equally clear that uses that were fair under
earlier tests are fair no longer. We haven't stretched fair use, or shrunk it; we've
simply moved it around. Today's fair use test seems to be optimized for The Wind
Done Gone.26 It's not obvious how the test should apply to the cases authors and
publishers have brought against Google Book Search 27 - (however you want those
28
cases to come out), - or to the case Viacom has filed against YouTube - (ditto), or to millions of everyday consumptive
uses made by ordinary readers, listeners,
29
viewers of copyrighted works.
But, at least if we limit our conversation to a room full of copyright lawyers and
19. Rogers
F. Supp. 370, 379
20. Blanch
21.
Pub. L.
(2000)).
22.

v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251-56 (2d Cir. 2006).
No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010

See H.R. REP. No. 102-873, pt. 1, at 24 (1992); Litman, supra note 10, at 384-85; Posting of

William F. Patry to Patry Copyright Blog, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/section-1008.html
(Aug. 17, 2005).
23. Opening Brief of Appellant at 20-24, 32-45, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403).
24.
Napster,239 F.3d at 1024.
25.
See also Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 133,

136-37 (2003) (arguing that when digital rights management systems reduce transaction costs, fair use
will become irrelevant for uses like recording movies offthe air).
26. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding Alice
Randell's Novel The Wind Done Gone a fair use of Margaret Mitchell's Gone With The Wind).
27. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005); McGrawHill v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 19,2005).
28. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 13, 2007); see
also Football Ass'n Premier League et al. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-03582-UA (S.D.N.Y. filed May
4, 2007); see also Posting of Kurt Hunt to MTTLR Blog, http://blog.mttlr.org/2007/l 1/timeline-ofyoutube-litigation.html (Nov. 14, 2007) (summarizing status of six lawsuits).
29. See Jessica Litman, Lawful PersonalUse, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1871, 1897-1903 (2007).
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copyright scholars, fair use remains a doctrine that permits a relatively narrow
swathe of exceptional, rather than everyday, uses.
II. THE ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY EXPANSION OF
COPYRIGHT
The 1909 Act gave owners of copyrights in different classes of works particular
rights defined on the basis of the class to which the work belonged.30 The rights
diverged most in the context of public performance rights, in part for historical
reasons: Congress had added exclusive performance rights for different classes of
copyrighted works at different times and in response to different threats of
infringement. Owners of copyrights in literary works, for example, received what
was in essence an exclusive right to present the work in public for profit as well as
an exclusive right to transcribe any performance. 31 Musical work copyrights
carried with them the exclusive rights to perform the music publicly for profit
except on jukeboxes. 32 Owners of copyrights in dramatic works had the exclusive
30. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. REV. 275,
280-81, 301-05 (1989).
31. 1909 Act§ 1(c):
to deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public for profit if it
be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work; to make
or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in
part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced, or
reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or
reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever.
Authors of lectures and sermons designed for oral delivery gained a public performance for profit right
in the 1909 Act. The public performance right for literary works and the transcription right were added
by Congress in the 1950s, in response to complaints of unauthorized radio broadcast of programs
incorporating or adapting books and poems. See Herman Finklestein, The Copyright Law: A
Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 1025, 1062 (1956); Theodore R. Kupferman, Rights in New Media, 19
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (#2) 172, 175 (1954); Kreymborg v. Durante, 21 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557
(S.D.N.Y. 1934). In Kreymborg, a poet sued Jimmy Durante and NBC for singing and broadcasting
three of his poems. The court dismissed the complaint:
Under the present Copyright Act, protection against public performance or delivery of
copyrighted works is afforded only in the case of a lecture, sermon, address, or similar
production, a drama, or a musical composition. Section 1; 17 U.S.C.A. § 1. Other copyrighted
works may be recited in public for profit without infringement. The point is of some moment,
now that radio broadcasting of novels, poems and so on is widespread. Nevertheless, it is
recognized that except as to the classes of copyrighted works referred to above, the author under
the existing statute cannot complain of public performance of his copyrighted works.
Kreymborg, 21 U.S.P.Q. at 557-58.
32.
1909 Act § l(e):
To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the
purpose of public performance for profit, and for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof,
to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any
form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read
or reproduced .... The reproduction or rendition of a musical composition by or upon coinoperated machines shall not be deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for
admission to the place where such reproduction or rendition occurs.
Musical works first received a public performance right in 1897. The 1909 Act limited the right to
public performance for profit and added what became the jukebox exemption. See Finkelstein, supra
HeinOnline -- 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 591 2007-2008
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right to perform the work publicly, unqualified by any for-profit limitation.33
In revising the copyright law in the 1976 Act, Congress unquestionably meant to
make some changes in the scope of exclusive rights. Most obviously, it increased
the duration of subsisting and future copyrights. 34 It redefined "perform" to
broaden its scope and overrule a line of recent Supreme Court cases construing it
narrowly. 35 It added a completely new right of public display.36 For the most part,
however, Congress's understanding of the revision bill was that it would reorganize
and standardize the treatment of different classes of works under the law without
significantly changing the substantive content of exclusive rights. This result was
probably dictated by the pervasive involvement of copyright lobbyists in every
aspect of the revision process: representatives of copyright-affected interests were
unwilling to settle for a new law that gave them substantially less than the law it
was designed to replace, so they insisted that any expansion in the scope of
exclusive rights be counteracted by exceptions that allowed them to continue to do
37
whatever it was they were already doing.
Thus, in redefining the meaning of performance, Congress added an exemption
in the new law to preserve the copyright exception the Supreme Court had
recognized for small restaurant owners when it read the 1909 Act narrowly,38 and
note 31, at 1058-59; Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350-54 (2002).
33.
1909Act§ (d):
To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be a dramatic
work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever
thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from
which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed,
represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it
in any manner or by any method whatsoever.
Dramatic works were the first works to receive a public performance right under United States Law. See
Act of August 18, 1956, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1956); Finklestein, supra note 31, at 1058.
34.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201,302, 303,304 (2000).
35.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62-65 (1976). In Buck v. JewellLaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931), the Supreme Court had held that a hotel's using a speaker
system to play radio broadcasts throughout the hotel was an actionable public performance for profit
under the 1909 Act. In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 162 (1975), however,
the Supreme Court later held that a small restaurant owner playing the radio over loudspeakers did not
perform the program within the meaning of the 1909 Act. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S.
394 (1974), the Court held that cable television operators who retransmitted television programming to
customers did not perform the programs within the meaning of the 1909 Act. The House Report
explains that the intent of the broad defintion of "perform" was to restore the construction the Supreme
Court had given the term in Buck v. Jewell-Salle. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 86-87.
36.
17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2000); see H.R. REP No. 94-1476 at 63-65.
37.
See Litman, supra note 30, at 317-32.
38.
Section 110(5) as originally enacted permitted:
[C]ommunication of a transmission embodying a performance of a work by the public reception
of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes,
unless(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the performance or display is further transmitted beyond the place where the receiving
apparatus is located.
See H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 86-87 ("Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case, assuming a

HeinOnline -- 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 592 2007-2008

2008]

BILLOWING WHITE

Goo

subjected the broader performance right to a new compulsory license negotiated by
cable television operators, broadcasters, and motion picture and television
producers to enable them to retransmit distant television signals without permission
on the payment of a statutory fee. 39 Although Congress simplified the various
public performance rights by eliminating the "for profit" qualifier on the rights
enjoyed by the authors of literary and non-dramatic musical works in section 106,40
it sought to preserve the extant limitations by exempting particular non-profit uses
under section 110.41 Similarly, it encumbered the new public display right with an
exception permitting the owner of any lawful copy to put it on display, essentially
confining the scope of the right to remote display via not-yet-common
technologies. 42 ,Congress's rewording of the reproduction, adaptation and
distribution rights were understood as simplification and codification of the scope
of those rights under the law as construed by the courts, and not as enhancements
of their reach or strength.43
A.

ORDINARY EXPANSION

Although the statute as enacted largely preserved the scope of established rights
and exceptions, its design predisposed it to favor of gradual expansion of copyright
owners' exclusive rights. By articulating exclusive rights in general, broad
language and delineating exceptions in narrow, detailed, specific language, the
drafters of the statute time-proofed the exclusive rights, while leaving the specific
exceptions vulnerable to obsolescence."4 As technology introduced new ways of
enjoying and exploiting copyrighted works, the narrowness of statutory exceptions
excluded new users, creating entry barriers for competitors to established players.
The drafters of the 1976 Act had anticipated that exploiters of new technology

small commercial establishment and the use of a home receiver with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped
within a relatively narrow circumference from the set, it is intended that the performances would be
exempt under clause (5)").
39. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
41. See H.R. REP. No.94-1476 at 62-65, 81-88 ("Clauses (1) through (4) of section 110 deal with
performances and exhibitions that are now generally exempt under the "for profit" limitation or other
provisions of the copyright law, and that are specifically exempted from copyright liability under this
legislation."). Congress also declined to expand the performance right to the owners of sound recording
copyrights, despite record companies' demands. See 1976 Act § 106(4). See generally Performance
Royalty: Hearings on S.1111 Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S.
Comm. On the Judiciary,94th Cong. 10 (1975).
42.
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 63-65, 79-80; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND
DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 183-86 (1964) (discussing how to draft exception to new

public display right to preserve extant author rights).
43. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 61-66. Thus, for example, the revision bill did not incorporate
provisions allowing the copyright owner to collect resale royalties, despite the request of authors and
publishers. See 1976 Act §§ 106(3), 109(a); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. On the
Judiciary,94th Cong. 469-74 (1975) (testimony of Professor Rondo Cameron).
44. See Litman, supra note 30, at 317-61.
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would need to ask Congress for their own tailored privileges. 45 When new users
showed up in Congress asking for exceptions, they discovered that copyright
owners and established users insisted on drafting their exceptions in less favorable
terms than the exceptions of their predecessors. 46 Satellite television was forced to
settle for a stingier compulsory license than cable television. 47 Internet and satellite
radio faced a compulsory licensing regime for the public performance of sound
recordings from which legacy radio broadcasters were exempt. 48 As newer
technologies superseded old ones, copyright owners' rights were gradually
encumbered by narrower exceptions with fewer general applications. Meanwhile,
some of the older exceptions became less useful in the modem world. The first
sale doctrine codified in section 109, for example, allows the owner of any lawful
copy of a work to sell, loan, rent or give it away.49 Section 109 does not, however,
permit the recipient of a lawful digital copy to transmit it to someone else, even if
she erases her own copy at substantially the same time, because it doesn't privilege
the making of an additional copy, even a temporary one. 50 Copyright owners and
the Copyright Office have opposed any amendment of the statute to create a
51
functional equivalent of the first sale doctrine for digital copies.
I've argued frequently that this design choice is bad technological policy and
that, in the long run, it undermines copyright law's legitimacy. 52 At the same time,
there's no question that, however ill-advised the choice, designing copyright laws
that behave this way is a choice that Congress made. I have somewhat more
difficulty with a massive recent expansion of section 106 exclusive rights that's
occurring without Congressional involvement.
B. EXTRAORDINARY EXPANSION

In 1995, Congress added a limited digital performance right for sound
45. See CopyrightLaw Revision: Hearings on HR. 4347 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary,89th Cong. 32-33 (1965)
(testimony of George Cary, Register of Copyrights); Litman, supranote 30, at 342-46.
46. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 58-59 (2d ed. 2006).
47. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Title II of Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949
(1998); see generally The Copyright Office Report on Compulsory Licensing of Broadcast Signals:
HearingBefore the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). Congress ultimately amended
the copyright statute in 1999 to bring the two compulsory licenses closer to parity. See Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Title I of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
120 (2000)).
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2000); see generally Parity, Pla forms, and Protection: The Future of
the Music Industry in the DigitalRadio Revolution: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2006).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
50. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (Aug. 2001),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca study.html. If we ignore RAM
copies, see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text, section 109 would permit the owner of a digital
copy to sell, rent or loan that copy by selling, renting or loaning the computer (or at least the hard disk)
on which the copy resided.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 46.
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recordings to section 106. Other than that, it has left the language of section 106
alone for more than thirty years. It has added a number of specific exceptions to
the statute, 54 and revised some of the ones that were already there, 55 but it has not
returned to redefine the scope of the basic exclusive copyright rights.
Nonetheless, our understanding of the scope of each of the bounded exclusive
rights has been evolving, so that they are no longer very bounded. Advocates have
persuaded courts 56 (and the authors of at least one copyright casebook) 57 that the
section 106(1) right "to reproduce a work in copies or phonorecords," initially
58
understood as the right to manufacturer the sorts of objects that required notice,
extends far beyond the original meaning of the statutory provision to encompass
any transitory appearance of any work in the memory of a computer. Copyright
owners have claimed, with mixed success, that the section 106(3) right to
"distribute copies to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental
lease or lending" is broad enough to cover acts that don't necessarily involve
distributing any copies to the public, or any sale or transfer of ownership, or any
rental, lease or lending. 59 The statute draws a line between public performances
and displays, which it subjects to copyright owner control, and private ones, which
it does not.60 That line is gradually disappearing, as copyright owners argue that
individual transmissions to people in their homes should always be deemed
public.

61

The forces fuelling this expansion are not obscure. 62 As new technology and
53. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat.
336 (1995) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000)).
54. See, e.g., Computer Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Title III of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2886 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
117 (2000)); Family Movie Act of 2005, Title II of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 223 (2005) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 110(11)
(2006)).
55. See, e.g., Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Title II of Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827, 2830 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (2000)); Computer Software Rental Amendments Act
of 1990, Title VIII of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134
(1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000)).
56. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994);
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999).
57.

See ROBERT A. GORMAN AND JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 87-

88 (7th ed. 2007).
58. See H.R.REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61-62 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir.
1997); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Capitol Records v.
Thomas, No. Civ. No. 06-1497, 2007 WL 2826645 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2007). But see Atlantic Recording
Corp. v. Howell, CV-06-02076-PHX-NVW, slip. op. at 10 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2008) ("Merely making an
unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work available to the public does not vioate a copyright holder's
exclusive right of distribution"); In re Napster Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 803 (N.D. Cal.
2005) ("to the extent that Hotaling suggests that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives rise
to liability under section 106(3), that view is contrary to the weight of above-cited authorities. It is also
inconsistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976").
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
61. See Twentieth Century Fox v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
62. For a succinct account of the forces underlying copyright's recent expansion, see Neil
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new cultural norms create new ways of enjoying copyrighted works, businesses
come up with new possibilities for earning profits by supporting those uses.
Copyright owners understandably want to share in any value earned in connection
with their works, but don't relish going to Congress and asking it to enact new
exclusive rights.63 Stretching the existing rights is a more palatable alternative, and
it's been an effective tactic thus far. Thirty years ago, an assertion that the
copyright law gave the copyright owner the exclusive right to "use" its copyrighted
work would have been dismissed as an obvious misunderstanding. 64 Recently, it's
become almost respectable as a description of the rights copyright owners do
control, or should.65
In Effects Associates v. Cohen, the court of appeals for the 9th Circuit considered
a copyright infringement claim brought by a special effects company against a
67
motion picture director. 66 Larry Cohen's cult classic motion picture "The Stuffa
tells a modem sci-fi/horror tale about aliens who invade the earth disguised as
addictively delicious frozen yogurt. As the film progresses, frozen yogurt bubbles
out of vats, onto the factory floor, and out the door, until the ground is covered in
masses of the stuff. (Our heroes ultimately save the day by blowing everything up,
in a scene depicted in the footage that motivated the lawsuit. Cohen didn't think
the effects were special enough to merit the price tag, so he used the footage but
declined to pay full price for it). The recent expansion in the scope of copyright
rights reminds me of "The Stuff" Bounded copyright rights have flowed out all
over the place like so much frozen yogurt until the terrain is completely covered by
billowing white goo. What used to be five or six discrete exclusive rights is
morphing into an all-purpose general use right, and our understanding of copyright
is evolving into the view that any use of a copyrighted
work that is not authorized
68
by the copyright owner or the statute is infringement.

Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT
LAW
(Fiona
Macmillan
ed.,
Edward
Elgar
forthcoming
2008),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1066241.
63. See Posting ofJessica Litman to MTTLR Blog, Nov. 17, 2007, http:/iblog.mttlr.org/2007/l 1/
copyright-reform-part- .html.
64. See, e.g., LATMAN, supra note 1,at 5 ("the copyright owner does not enjoy the exclusive right
to 'use' his copyrighted work").
65. See Motion Picture Association of America, What is Copyright?, RespectCopyrights.org,
http://www.respectcopyrights.org/content.html (last visited May 4, 2008) ("Simply put, copyrights
protect creativity. They do this by giving who creates an original work exclusive control over how it is
used."); U.S. Copyright Office, Can I Use Someone Else's Work? Can Someone Else Use Mine?,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-fairuse.html ("How do I get permission to use somebody else's
work?/You can ask for it.") (last visited May 3, 2008).
66. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
67. THE STUFF: A LARRY COHEN FILM (New World Pictures 1985). Like many copyright
teachers, I play some of the special effects scenes for my class when we're talking about this case. See
17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2000). The pedagogical value is minor, but scene 23, in which Garrett Morris
explodes into a rampaging mass of frozen-yogurt-like glop, is too dreadful not to share.
68. See Jessica Litman, CreativeReading, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (2007).
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COPYRIGHT LIBERTIES

When we imagine copyright law as a rule that all uses of a copyrighted work
must be authorized either by the statute or by the copyright owner, we immediately
confront a host of common everyday uses that are neither. 69 Personal uses7" are
one obvious category of uses the statute doesn't seem to anticipate as coming
within its range. Some of these uses, no doubt, are infringing, but many of them
are not. There is no express statutory exemption for the copies I make when I back
up my hard disk,71 the public performance I commit when I listen to the music on
my iPod in an airplane, 72 or the derivative work I prepare when I help my son make
a Halloween costume that looks as much as possible like a character in his favorite
manga or TV show. 73 Yet, I am completely confident that none of these uses is
actionable. 74 Purists may want to claim that they're illegal, but if they tried to take
that principle to court, they would lose. One could argue that the reason that none
of these uses is infringing is that they all come within the fair use doctrine that
shelters home videotaping. (Does it?) That approach, though, embraces a very
broad version of the fair use doctrine.
If one is determined to keep fair use narrow and exceptional, the sort of doctrine
under which The Wind Done Gone is fair use but home videotaping is not, then
personal uses pose a difficult dilemma. If copyright's exclusive rights reach
ordinary personal uses made by readers, listeners and viewers of copyrighted
works, the statute doesn't tell us how to treat them. Few personal uses are the
subject of express statutory exemptions, because Congress didn't envision its
copyright statute as having any application to them. 75 While most personal uses
might have been impliedly licensed by copyright owners in 1976, at least so long as
they were non-public, non-commercial, or both, copyright owners are markedly
less sanguine about unlicensed personal uses today. For one thing, to the extent
that digital rights management and broadcast flag technology hold out a (possibly
illusory) promise that personal uses can be monitored, metered and monetized,
copyright owners are loathe to give up the promise of lucrative new markets.76 For
69. See Litman, supra note 29, at 1897-1901.
70. For a definition of personal use, see id. at 1893-94.
71. See id.at 1897-1900.
72. Listening to my iPod counts as a performance because in doing so I "play" the music "by
means of any device or process." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The performance is public because it
occurs "at a place open to the public." See id.; Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d
154 (3d Cir. 1984). I am not entitled to an exemption under section 110(4) of the statute because the
airplane is not a place of which it is accurate to say that there is "no direct nor indirect admission charge
...
17 .U.S.C. § 110(4) (2000). Moreover, the fact that lots of airline passengers bring along their
iPods is one factor in the airlines' discontinuing their in-air canned music services, for which copyright
owners were paid royalties, so my use of my iPod has a small but real negative effect on copyright
owners' bottom line.
73.

See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).

74. See Litman, supra note 29, at 1903-1908. For a discussion of other, similar examples, see id.
at 1897-1906.
75. See id. at 1905-07.
76. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 113 (2003); LITMAN, supra
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another, the recent deluge of copyright suits seeking to recover for contributory or
vicarious infringement require a predicate direct infringer. 77 If individual personal
uses are outside of the scope of copyright liability, then making zillions of dollars
by facilitating millions of individual personal uses is similarly not actionable.
Arguments about whether extant statutory copyright rules apply as written to
these personal uses, and whether they should, thus, tend to rely on normative
preferences to do most of the heavy lifting. It is difficult to argue that Congress in
1976 imagined that it was drafting rules to govern the behavior of ordinary readers,
listeners and viewers, 78 but relatively easy to argue that if Congress imagined that it
was excluding uses by ordinary readers, listeners and viewers, it would have said so
explicitly. 79 The answer in either case follows directly from the placement of the
burden of proof.80 Congress, of course, gave little thought to the question because
none of the lobbyists working on copyright revision had the foresight to bring it
up. 81 In either case, we're reaching a conclusion based on what Congress didn't
say. If we conceive of copyright as a bundle of bounded exclusive rights to control
the exploitation of a work,82 it makes sense to see the liberties to read, listen and
view as outside of copyright's scope. 83 If our idea of copyright is an all-purpose
use right with narrow exceptions, then reading, viewing and listening are just like
other uses, and absent special exceptions, should fall within the ambit of the
copyright owners' control.
Expanding copyright rights to encompass personal uses, while convenient for
the purposes of rolling out new technological protection measures and bringing
more secondary liability suits, poses significant dangers for the overall fabric of
copyright law. This is especially true if we accomplish this expansion by claiming
that ordinary individuals have always been liable for making personal uses under a
thirty-year old law; they just didn't know it.
The most obvious danger of such a move is the threat it poses to copyright
law's already wounded legitimacy.84 After Napster,85 the Eldred case,86 and the
recording industry's "John Doe" suits against thousands of individual users of peerto-peer file sharing networks, 87 ordinary people are paying more attention to the

note 46, at 201-02.
77. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
78. See LITMAN, supranote 46, at 96.
79. See Litman, supranote 10, at 369.
80. See David McGowan, CopyrightNonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REv. 2, 2-7 (2004).
81. See Litman, supra note 30, at 346-49.
82. See L. Ray Patterson & Christopher M. Thomas, Personal Use in Copyright Law: An
Unrecognized ConstitutionalRight, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 475,475-84 (2003).
83. Professor Patterson perceptively cast the distinction as one between use of the copyright and
use of the work. See, e.g, id. at 478-79; L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving
the Conflict between PropertyRights andPoliticalRights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 710 (2003).
84. See LITMAN, supra note 46, at 111-117; Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Law Got a Bad
Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61 (2002).
85. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
86. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
87. See, e.g., Capitol Records v. Thomas, No. Civ. No. 06-1497, 2007 WL 2826645 (D. Minn.
Oct. 1, 2007). See also generally Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the
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copyright law, but they don't necessarily approve of what they see. Record labels
and motion picture studios have had opportunities to communicate to the public
that the money that they collect under the copyright system really goes into the
pockets of individual musicians, writers, performers and directors, but have let
those opportunities slip away. 88 The public has little confidence in the underlying
fairness of the current copyright rules, and is more likely to focus on just how
inconvenient those rules make their lives. Copyright theorists talk about copyright
as a system to encourage authors and distributors to invest in creation and
dissemination of authorship. 89 The public invests in the copyright system as well:
it invests by paying its legislators to enact copyright laws, and it invests by
complying with the laws thus enacted. If the public perceives copyright laws to
give it a poor return on its investment, it may well respond by divesting - either
pressing its elected representatives to enact additional limitations and privileges, or
simply failing to comply with rules it no longer perceives as legitimate.
The second danger is more subtle. We are at risk of forgetting that encouraging
people to read, listen to and view copyrighted works is as much a purpose of
90
copyright law as encouraging people to create and disseminate those works.
When copyright rights are narrow and bounded, they have little impact on readers,
listeners and viewers. If they expand to encompass a general "use" right, they
threaten to burden reading, listening and viewing in substantial ways.
In an earlier article, I argued that reading, listening and viewing are essential
copyright liberties, long implicit in the doctrine's architecture and essential to its
purpose.9 1 That assertion is controversial. I haven't run into anyone who actually
argues that, so long as creators are impelled to create and disseminators are willing
to invest in those creations, the copyright system would be doing its job, even if
nobody read the books, sang the songs, watched the movies or listened to the
recordings. Plenty of people, though, don't think we need to worry about the
readers, viewers and listeners of the world, because they can take case of
themselves. 92
Whether readers, listeners and viewers need protection for core copyright
liberties, though, is (predictably) a function of how broadly we define copyright's
exclusive rights.93 If copyright rights spill out all over personal uses like billowing
Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725 (2005);
Recording Industry v. The People Blog, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/ (last visited
May 7, 2008).
88. I will mention two from a very long list: record labels are collecting thousands of dollars in
settlement of individual "John Doe" suits, but have declined to pay a penny of the settlements to the
artists whose rights they purport to be vindicating. Motion picture studios elected to take a hard line in
the recent writers' strike. Both were missed chances to disabuse the public of its cynicism about who
really pockets copyright proceeds under our current legal system.
89. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.1 at 4-5 (1989).
90. See Litman, supra note 29, at 1879-93.
91. Id. at 1893. I'm farfrom the first to make this claim. See, e.g., Patterson & Thomas, supra
note 82.
92. See, e.g., David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copy Duty Under U.S.
CopyrightLaw, 52 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 345 (2005).
93. See Litman, supra note 68, at 179, 183.
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white goo, then we need either some mechanism to contain them, or we need to
give serious thought to blowing up the current system and starting again from
scratch.
IV. THE SCOPE OF FAIR USE
Imagine three copyright lawyers at a copyright conference. Let's make them
caricatured types, and say that one is a "copyright maximalist," 94 one is a
"copyright minimalist, ' 95 and one is a "copyright traditionalist." 96 Let's imagine
that the copyright maximalist favors unbounded exclusive rights and a small,
flexible fair use privilege. The copyright minimalist favors bounded exclusive
rights and a broad and encompassing fair use privilege. The copyright traditionalist
favors bounded exclusive rights and a small, flexible fair use privilege. We can
each choose which lawyer we want to play. We meet at conferences like these and
debate who is right and who is wrong, whose version of the law violates the Berne
Convention and whose version of the law violates the Constitution. These
conversations earn lots of CLE credit, but don't actually change anyone's minds.
At the end of the day, we go home with visions of fair use in our heads that have
less and less relevance in tomorrow's world.
Copyright experts adjust quickly to new reformulations of how fair use is
supposed to work. We know that the idea that all non-commercial uses are
presumptively fair isn't the law. Not any more. It may have been the law once, but
that was then, and this is now. Ordinary readers, listeners and viewers who are not
copyright lawyers, though, understandably don't share the view of fair use as a
malleable doctrine allowing whatever exceptional uses are fashionable this year.
They don't appreciate that when the Supreme Court decides a different case and
applies a different test, that means the law has changed. The Court's fair use
decisions have been understood by lay members of the general public as
recognizing broad categories of uses that will always, or almost always be fair.
Sony v. Universal Studios stands in the public mind for the proposition that home
recording of television programming, and other home copying for personal use, are
(and have always been) fair uses. 97 Campbell v. Acuff Rose is taken to mean that
any parodic use is (and was, and will be) fair.98 Cranky commentary and testimony
94. I've taken the term from Pamela Samuelson. See Pamela Samuleson, The Copyright Grab,
WIRED, Jan. 1996, availableat http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.0 1/white.paper.html?pg=2.
95. See id.; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 287 (1996).
96. A designation used by Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 ORE. L. REv. 299, 303
(1996).
97. See, e.g., John Roska, Copyrighted Material Can Be Duplicated For Personal,
Noncommercial Use, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, Jul. 29, 1999, at 2 ("You should be able to make
copies for your personal use, even of copyrighted material. That should fall under the "fair use"
exception to the law that otherwise prohibits copying copyrighted material. It's just like taping a CD to
play in your car."); Mike Snider, No copying, no trading?No kidding: Copyrightfight might narrowour
options, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2001, at 1D ("Today, millions of people videotape TV programs and
record music on compact discs, thanks in part to the principle of 'fair use .... '").
98. See, e.g., Editorial: Purple craze, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at M4 ("The public not only
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complaining that the public seems to think all sorts of unfair uses are fair 99 miss
two facts: First, we are now trying to apply to the public at large a law that was
written by and for entities with copyright lawyers in their back pockets. Second,
most people don't have copyright lawyers in their back pockets.
Copyright historians know that copyright owners have experienced persistent
difficulty in trying to apply rules drafted to fit familiar actors to the unanticipated
business of unfamiliar actors - the new actors insist on crashing the party and
trying to rewrite the rules to make them more suitable. 1" If we insist on extending
exclusive copyright rights to cover ordinary behavior by readers, listeners and
viewers, they will in turn insist on a very broad version of fair use. If we are
determined to preserve fair use as a doctrine limited to narrow and exceptional
cases, then we will need either to recognize broad exemptions outside of fair use
for personal uses that are noncommercial, nonpublic, or both, or to revisit the scope
of exclusive rights. In that event, we'll have a lot of goo to clean up.

has an interest in discussing cultural icons such as Barney ....it has the right to parody them"); John
Smyntek, Names and Faces, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sep. 11, 2007, at 5 ("Sued: By celebutante Paris
Hilton, Hallmark Cards Inc. over the use of her picture and catchphrase 'That's hot' on a greeting card,
entitled 'Paris's First Day as a Waitress.' Hallmark defended the card as parody, which is normally
protected under fair-use law.").
99. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 92; I. Fred Koenigsberg, Humpty Dumpty in Copyrightland:
The Fifth
Annual ChristopherA. Meyer MemorialLecture, 51 J.COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 677 (2004).
100. See LITMAN, supra note 46, at 35-63. 122-145.
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